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CHAPTER
Services trade and global value chains
CECILIA HEUSER AND AADITYA MATTOO
In Moliere’s The Bourgeois Gentleman, M. Jourdain discovers that he has “been speaking prose all my life, and didn’t even know it!” We suspect that many of us have been working on global value chains (GVCs) without quite knowing it. A value 
chain comprises “the full range of activities that are required 
to bring a product from its conception, through its design, its 
sourced raw materials and intermediate inputs, its marketing, 
its distribution and its support to the final consumer.”1 A GVC 
emerges when these activities are undertaken by entities based in 
or from different countries. Several studies of international trade in 
services inputs and of foreign direct investment in business serv-
ices are thus potentially relevant to an examination of GVCs.
Two questions arise. What makes a value chain a GVC? And 
why do services merit special consideration in a discussion of 
GVCs?
The first question has sometimes been reformulated as “How 
many ‘borders’ does a value chain have to cross to qualify as a 
GVC?” (perhaps analogously to a recent Nobel laureate’s ques-
tion, “How many roads must a man walk down, before you call 
him a man?”). In the GVC case, some analysts have suggested a 
fairly precise answer. For example, the widely used GVC partic-
ipation index proposed in Koopman and others (2010) is deter-
mined by the foreign value added embodied in the gross exports 
of a given country and the domestic value added embodied in 
the gross exports of third countries. This definition would set a 
GVC — such as importing to export — apart from value chains that 
involve a single international transaction, an import or export 
of intermediate goods. It may well be true that multiple inter-
national transactions along a value chain have economic impli-
cations that are qualitatively distinct from (the sum of) a series 
of single international transactions, even though this has not yet 
been established empirically. However, it may also be true that 
the implications of even single international transactions along 
a value chain are economically important and policy relevant. So 
this chapter adopts a broader view of GVCs that also includes 
single international transactions, consistent with the approach in 
chapter 2, covering both simple GVCs, with one border crossing, 
and complex GVCs, with two or more border crossings (Wang, 
Wei, and Zhu 2017).2
The second question can be reformulated as two questions: 
Should services be examined separately from goods in a discus-
sion of GVCs? And should they be treated as a single broad cate-
gory, the same way goods are? Our answer to both questions: In 
some respects no, in others yes.
In some ways, services play a role similar to that of goods in 
GVCs, whether they are meant for final consumption or as inputs 
in the production of goods or other services. In fact, the most 
detailed analysis of the role of services in value chains — drawing 
on the new world input-output tables and value-added trade 
databases — relates only to situations in which services are traded 
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in a manner akin to how goods are traded. However, services 
deserve special attention for four reasons, relating to how they 
are transacted, how they affect downstream sectors, how they 
are regulated, and how international cooperation can contribute 
to integrating national markets.
First, the notion of GVCs involving services needs to encom-
pass a broader range of transactions. GVCs need to encompass 
not only transactions crossing borders, but also transactions 
within countries between national and foreign entities. While 
there is good reason to take a similar broad view of GVCs involv-
ing only goods, the case is overwhelming for services because 
focusing only on cross-border trade would ignore the large 
share of international transactions in services that takes place 
through consumers traveling to other countries (consumption 
abroad, or mode 2 in World Trade Organization [WTO] parlance); 
commercial presence (through foreign investment, or mode 3 
in the WTO); and the presence of natural persons (temporary 
immigrants, or mode 4 in the WTO).3 Even though the ability to 
measure the role in GVCs of international services transactions 
through commercial presence is limited, ways have been found 
to estimate their economic impact.4
Second, the argument that services can have a substantial 
economic impact because they are vital inputs into produc-
ing downstream goods and services may not seem a sufficient 
reason for separate consideration. After all, goods such as com-
puters are also vital inputs. But two features of services seem to 
merit special focus. One is that the very existence of GVCs is due 
to improvements in such services as transport, communication, 
and computing (or information and communication technology 
services) that have made it possible to fragment and coordinate 
production globally. Another is the growing evidence that when 
GVCs include finance, communications, transport, and profes-
sional and other business services in favorable price–quality bun-
dles and diverse varieties, firms perform better. These services 
enable firms to invest in new business opportunities and better 
production technology, to exploit economies of scale by con-
centrating production in fewer locations, to efficiently manage 
inventories, and to make coordinated decisions with their sup-
pliers and customers. The result can be increased total factor 
productivity and shifts in the pattern of comparative advantage.
Third, services also differ at least qualitatively from goods in 
the nature of the policies that both inhibit or encourage the emer-
gence of services-related GVCs. Border measures such as tariffs 
are much less relevant for services trade than for goods trade, 
and behind-the-border regulatory measures are much more rel-
evant. Some examples: Cross-border trade in international trans-
port services is impeded by the exclusion of third-country provid-
ers and by quantitative restrictions in bilateral agreements. Trade 
through commercial presence in banking and communication 
services must confront restrictions on foreign ownership and reg-
ulatory requirements that can be discretionary and discriminatory. 
The presence of foreign professionals is prevented by restrictive 
visa and work permit rules as well as by a refusal to recognize 
their qualifications and licenses. And trade in all data-intensive 
services is threatened by diverging national privacy laws.5
Fourth, services markets have seen considerable unilateral 
liberalization that has facilitated the emergence of GVCs with 
services as both inputs and outputs. Unfortunately, international 
cooperation has striven to replicate mostly the goods model of 
“reciprocal market opening,” which has so far delivered little 
incremental liberalization. Because the impediments are differ-
ent for services-related GVCs, international cooperation needs to 
take a different form. In particular, much more could be achieved 
through a greater emphasis on regulatory cooperation.
The first section below sets the stage by describing the role 
of services in GVCs, and the second presents the methods and 
datasets currently used to measure this role. The third examines 
the patterns that emerge, showing the absolute and growing 
importance of services in GVCs and suggests possible reasons. 
The fourth discusses the implications of services’ presence in 
GVCs, particularly for total factor productivity and patterns of 
comparative advantage. The fifth presents policy implications of 
the evidence on the impediments to services being part of GVCs, 
and the sixth argues that these impediments are most effectively 
addressed through new forms of regulatory cooperation.
The role of services in global value chains
In some ways services play a role analogous to that of goods. But 
their roles are also different, in that services facilitate the emer-
gence of GVCs in a way that goods do not. Services can be seen as 
elements in GVCs that are different from the typical cross-border 
or arm’s length trade usually analyzed in the case of goods.6
Services global value chains
The emergence of GVCs has increased the opportunities for 
international specialization not only in final goods and their parts, 
but also in services and services tasks. In many instances, serv-
ices represent the end stage of a GVC, with services firms choos-
ing to source their inputs internationally. For example, financial 
services providers have outsourced and offshored their back-of-
fice data-management and analytical tasks, architects their basic 
design tasks, and doctors the reading of radiological images. In 
each case, direct interaction with the client is by locally based 
services providers. It has been suggested that in fragmented 
production processes of services, value is sometimes created 
differently from how it is created in goods value chains. Instead 
of following a linear value chain, in which products move sequen-
tially from upstream to downstream, adding value at each stage 
(a “snake” formation in the terminology of Baldwin and Ven-
ables 2013), value creation in services value chains may occur as 
a network of activities, such as platform-based communication 
or transportation networks (a “spider” formation in Baldwin and 
Venables). In such cases, multiple parts come together to add 
value simultaneously in forming a final product or component 
— or through alternative models, such as facilitated user net-
works (which create value by linking customers, as in insurance 
or banking services) and solution shops (which create value by 
solving customer problems; Miroudot 2016).
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Services as links in global value chains
One reason to consider some services in GVCs separately from 
goods is their role in enabling GVCs to emerge. The international 
fragmentation of production was driven partly by changes in 
transport, logistics, and information and communication tech-
nology services. In particular, lower costs and improvements in 
these services made it possible for firms to manage production 
processes that are geographically split (Jones and Kierzkow-
ski 2001a, 2001b). Even though the anecdotal evidence itself is 
compelling, a serious gap in the literature is not having rigorous 
empirical evidence on how improved access to these connecting 
services across space and time has facilitated the emergence of 
GVCs.
Services as outsourced inputs in global value chains
Besides their role as links between different stages of value 
chains, services often are important inputs in the production pro-
cess of manufacturing goods and services. For example, a value 
chain may start with research, design, and engineering activities 
that are clearly services inputs when they are outsourced. At the 
other end of the value chain are other services such as marketing 
and distribution that are also important stages in ensuring that a 
product reaches the consumer. Therefore, services are not only 
support functions that enable GVCs, but they are also crucial 
inputs in key stages of production.
Yet being vital inputs into goods and services production by 
itself does not constitute sufficient reason to consider services 
separately from goods in analyzing GVCs. After all, goods are 
also vital inputs. The fact that access to some services of suffi-
ciently high quality, low price, and diversity may matter for firm 
performance is an empirical question akin to the role of infor-
mation and communication technology goods in determining 
performance. But the fact that access to services inputs comes 
through foreign direct investment and the movement of people 
more often than it does for goods inputs warrants considering 
services separately and through a broader view of GVCs. The rel-
ative importance of digital delivery in services also requires mod-
ifying the traditional customs-mediated and customs-measured 
role of international transactions within GVCs.
Services as in-house inputs in global value chains
Another feature of services as inputs arises in a notion of GVCs 
that goes beyond arm’s length market-based transactions to 
functions within the firm. It is common for firms to develop their 
own support services in house, such as research and develop-
ment activities or information technology capacity. This means 
that services are produced not only by services firms, but also by 
manufacturing firms (Kelle 2013), which often export a variety of 
headquarters services to their affiliates. Some analysts argue that 
this “servicification” inside firms may need to be considered for a 
full assessment of the impact of services on trade and value cre-
ation (Miroudot 2016). But as noted below, this deconstruction 
of activities within firms, when taken to the limit, may blur the 
distinction between goods and services because all tasks could 
be considered services.
How services participation in global value 
chains is measured
For a long time, measuring trade in services took a back seat 
because data on trade in goods was more extensive and readily 
available. More recently, measuring trade in services has received 
impetus from the new prominence in international policy and 
negotiating agendas given to liberalizing trade in services, the 
increased importance of services in GVCs, and the availability of 
multicountry input-output tables.
Statistics on trade in value added cover services as links, 
outsourced inputs, or final products in global value chains
As long as services are final products or inputs supplied by other 
firms in the production process, input-output tables can help 
identify their contribution to value added in output or exports 
(Francois and Woerz 2008; Nordås 2008).
The starting point for analyzing the contribution of services 
to GVCs is the decomposition of value added in exports by its 
origin. Following seminal work by Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), 
an expanding literature has proposed alternative decomposi-
tions of trade in value added and measures of participation in 
GVCs (Koopman, Wang, and Wei 2014; Foster- McGregor and 
Stehrer 2013; Los, Timmer, and de Vries 2016). As in Miroudot 
(2016), the analysis here relies on the calculations published by 
the Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD)–
WTO Trade in Value-Added database, which features several 
indicators that account for services value added in trade (OECD 
2013).
The main indicator is the total value added (VA) of the services 
sector embodied in gross exports of industry i and country c as 
a percentage of total gross exports of i of country c, (SERV VAc,i). 
It is calculated as:
SERV VAc,i =  ∑ j∈SVc,j(Bc,c )jiEXGRc,i/EXGRc,i +  
∑p∑ j∈SVp,j(Bp,c )jiEXGRc,p,i /EXGRc,i (1)
where Vp,j is the value-added share of services industry j in coun-
try p; B is the global Leontief inverse of the intercountry input-
output matrix, B = (I – A)–1, and therefore its ji-th element (Bp,c)ji 
represents the total requirements of j from p to produce a unit of 
i in country c; EXGRc,p,i is gross exports from country c to country 
p for any given industry i; and EXGRc,i is total gross exports for 
country c and industry i. The first term then represents all direct 
and embodied domestic services value added in the exports of 
product i from country c, and the second term represents all for-
eign domestic services value added embodied in the exports of 
product i from country c.
The services content of gross exports can then be decom-
posed into a domestic and a foreign part, and the domestic part 
can be further decomposed into the direct domestic services 
industry value added content of gross exports (the value added 
from the exporting services sectors), the indirect domestic 
services content of gross exports (the domestic services value 
added embodied in other exporting industries), and the re-im-
ported domestic services value-added content of gross exports 
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(domestic services value added in imported intermediate inputs 
used in exports; figure 6.1).7 This decomposition can also be 
analyzed by services type. A similar approach can be used in 
measuring the services value added embodied in foreign final 
demand.
Value-added trade statistics based on multicountry input-
output tables are a starting point for understanding the impor-
tance of services inputs in GVCs, but these statistics cannot fully 
capture all services that are relevant to fragmented production 
processes. In particular, services traded through WTO mode 3 
will not be accurately identified as foreign services in traditional 
value-added measures.
Existing statistics on trade in value added do not fully 
capture services traded though commercial presence
Since the supply of services through commercial presence 
abroad is an important way of conducting international trans-
actions in services (mode 3–commercial presence), the distinc-
tion between foreign- and domestic-owned firms is particularly 
relevant for services. Accurately assessing the contribution of 
services to GVCs requires that the ownership status of the firm 
that originates the value added affect whether that contribution 
is classified as domestic or foreign, as this is bound to inform 
services trade policy.8
A GVC accounting framework that allows for this sort of dis-
tinction between firms can be similar to the global supply-use/
input-output tables commonly used now, such as OECD 
Inter-Country Input-Output Tables, but it would also need to 
identify foreign or domestic ownership for each commodity/
industry. While such a framework is not currently available, ini-
tiatives in this direction are under way by the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) and the OECD (Fetzer and Strassner 2015; 
OECD 2015). In both cases the proposed approach is to link 
existing supply-use tables to ownership and trade data — such as 
OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Tables to the Activity of Mul-
tinational Enterprises Database, or BEA input-output accounts 
to BEA surveys and U.S. Internal Revenue Service Statistics of 
Income data.
Services as in-house inputs in global value chains
When services inputs are supplied in-house, value-added analy-
sis does not capture their contribution to GVCs. Additional infor-
mation is needed to identify these services activities within each 
production process.
One way to address this issue is to consider business functions, 
in order to distinguish between the primary or core activity of the 
firm and support functions such as research and development, 
sales, marketing, or information technology services. But statistics 
on business functions have only recently started to be collected in 
some national surveys (Sturgeon and others 2013).9 Alternatively, 
labor force surveys can be used to identify business functions by 
matching occupation classifications to business functions (Timmer, 
Stehrer, and de Vries 2015). Each industry is assigned one business 
function to describe its core activity, which usually covers occupa-
tions directly related to the production process. All other business 
functions are classified as support activities (or secondary busi-
ness functions) and can be regarded as services activities if they 
would be classified as services if outsourced. This approach may 
supplement the usual trade in value added analysis, providing a 
sense of the role of in-house services in GVCs.10
While it is theoretically possible to determine a single core func-
tion per industry, it can be difficult in practice to establish what is not 
a support function. Even if it were feasible to distinguish between 
tasks that would be services if they had taken place at arm’s length 
(such as bookkeeping) and other tasks that are intrinsically manu-
facturing or agricultural in nature (such as wood processing), such 
distinctions slide on a slippery slope and raise the question: What is 
not a service? Ultimately, almost any task can be conceived of as an 
arm’s length service. For example, one could either directly employ 
a worker in the horticultural sector or buy “fruit-picking” services 
from an individual or a firm. So this deconstruction of the firm into 
constituent tasks could reduce each firm into a bundle of services.
The emerging patterns of services in global 
value chains
This section presents some stylized facts about the increasing 
role of services in GVCs — first in aggregate and then across 
countries and industries. It then discusses why this might be hap-
pening. The evidence is obtained by computing the value-added 
measures described in the previous section using the OECD 
Trade in Value-Added database. Some results are also presented 
to illustrate the potential relevance of in-house services in GVCs.
FIGURE 6.1 Deconstructing services value added in gross 
exports
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The patterns of services in GVCs
The share of services in value-added trade is large and increasing
Multiple studies have found that the share of services in trade in 
value added is both large (significantly larger than the share of 
services in gross trade) and increasing (OECD, WTO, and World 
Bank Group 2014). While services as a share of total world gross 
exports have remained around 20% since 1980, in value-added 
terms they have increased from below 30% to more than 40% 
(compare figures 6.2 and 6.3). For Asia, this pattern holds by 
country as well, with no major differences between developed or 
developing, high-technology or low-technology, or high-wage or 
low-wage countries (Baldwin, Forslid, and Ito 2015).
The increasing share of services in value-added trade was 
driven by services embodied in exports
Now take a closer look at the recent evolution of services value 
added in exports, decomposed into direct and indirect domestic 
value added and foreign value added (figure 6.4). While direct 
exported value added shows a notable increase from 1995–2011, 
FIGURE 6.2 Gross exports of goods and services as a 
percentage of total world gross exports, 1980, 1995, and 
2009
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Johnson and Noguera 2016.
FIGURE 6.3 Value-added exports of goods and services as 
a percentage of total world value-added exports, 1980, 
1995, and 2009
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FIGURE 6.4 Share of direct, indirect, and foreign services value added in world gross exports, 1995–2011
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Source: Miroudot 2016 based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–World Trade Organization Trade in Value-Added database.
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more than 65% of the growth of services value added in exports 
was due to an increase in services embodied in other exports. 
Both domestic and foreign embodied services grew, but the for-
eign services value-added component grew the most.
Figures 6.2–6.4 suggest that an increasing part of manufacturing 
exports corresponds to services value added and that a growing 
share of these “additional” services is being sourced abroad. How-
ever, since these measures are based on cross-border trade, value 
added from foreign services traded through commercial presence is 
counted in the “domestic” category, as previously mentioned. The 
apparent shift toward foreign services in the decomposition of serv-
ices value added probably understates what actually happened.
The share of services value added in exports varies 
significantly across countries
Decomposition of services value added in exports by country in 
2011 supports the general observations that the share of services 
value added is high and that embodied services explain a large 
share of the total for all countries (figure 6.5). However, countries 
differ in their share of services value added in exports, ranging from 
35% in Chile to close to 90% in Luxembourg. These differences 
reflect some specialization patterns: countries on the bottom of the 
figure specialize in exports of commodities (Chile, Norway) or man-
ufactured goods (Republic of Korea, Mexico), while economies on 
the top are services exporters. Countries specialized in services also 
FIGURE 6.5 Direct and indirect domestic services value added and foreign services value added in gross exports, by 
country, 2011
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have more indirect (domestic and foreign) services value added in 
exports because services are mainly produced with other services.
The share of services value added in exports also varies 
across industries
The share of services value added in exports ranges from 11% in 
mining to 38% in chemicals and motor vehicles (figure 6.6). Cau-
tion in interpreting these results is advised, since value-added 
measures are based on input-output tables defined by arm’s 
length transactions and thus exclude services provided in-house. 
Mining exports are in many cases driven by large state-owned 
enterprises that are likely to provide most services in-house (Mir-
oudot 2016). For example, in Australia, where that is not the case, 
the share of services value added in exports is 24%.
The decomposition of services value added by type of serv-
ices seems similar across manufacturing industries (see figure 
6.6). Distribution represents about a third of services value 
added in exports, as do business services, which includes tele-
communications services, computer services, professional serv-
ices, research and development services, consulting, advertising 
and marketing services, technical testing services, and environ-
mental services. The last third is split among transport, finance, 
and other services (a category covering construction, hotels and 
restaurants, government services, health and education, enter-
tainment, and audio-visual services).
Why is the share of services in value-added exports 
increasing?
Figures 6.2–6.4 reveal an increasing share of services in value 
added exports, suggesting that the increase may be explained 
in part by an increase in services value added embodied in 
exported manufactures.
The growing importance of services in the economy has been 
a matter of discussion for a long time. Bhagwati (1984) set out the 
main reasons: “splintering” (outsourcing services formerly pro-
vided in-house by manufacturing firms), the high-income elastic-
ity of the demand for services, and relative price shifts due to 
the lower growth of productivity in services than in goods. Splin-
tering was seen as the spontaneous result of the specialization 
opportunities arising from growth and technical change.
More recently, the increasing importance of services within 
manufactured goods — servicification, as it has been called — has 
been extensively documented, in line with the evidence in fig-
ures 6.2–6.4.11 While it has not yet been possible to empirically 
establish the cause of servicification, Baldwin, Forslid, and Ito 
(2015) explore its potential sources in a way that echoes Bhag-
wati (1984). These include reclassification, task-composition 
shifts in connecting services and final goods, and task–relative 
price shifts.
Reclassification. Over the past decades, many of the services tra-
ditionally sourced in-house by manufacturing firms, and thus clas-
sified as manufacturing, began to be sourced at arm’s length and 
classified accordingly as services. The servicification that arises 
from this reclassification can happen even if there is no change 
in products, production process, or relative price of inputs. This 
argument corresponds to Bhagwati’s “splintering” reason.
Task-composition shift: connecting services. The emergence 
of GVCs requires connections among geographically separate 
FIGURE 6.6 Decomposition of services value added in world gross exports, by manufacturing industry, 2011
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production units, which typically involve services links. These 
links (including telecommunications, transportation, and mailing) 
contribute to the value added embodied in the final good. So 
outsourcing and offshoring tend to increase the share of services 
in a final good’s value added.
Task-composition shift: changes in final goods. The second 
task-composition shift arises from changes in the nature of the 
final manufactured goods. For example, today’s cars contain 
software, which comes from the services sector. Similarly, many 
other manufactured goods have become more intensive in serv-
ices. This argument resembles the argument that the income 
elasticity of demand for services is high, but in this case techno-
logical progress is enhancing the services content and the qual-
ity of manufactured goods.
Task–relative price shift. For a variety of reasons, including the 
need for coordination and face-to-face interaction, offshoring 
tasks tends to be easier for intermediate goods than for interme-
diate services. Since the decision to offshore a task is typically 
driven by cost-reduction motives, there is a natural tendency for 
offshoring to reduce the relative price of the offshored tasks. If 
most of the offshored tasks are typically performed by the man-
ufacturing sector, then offshoring would — in a mechanical way 
— raise services value added in final manufactured goods. This 
argument is a variant of the differential productivity growth 
reason but is being driven by differences between goods and 
services in cost-reducing opportunities through offshoring.
The limits of value-added analysis: In-house services play 
a large role in manufacturing
As mentioned earlier, services enter GVCs not only as outsourced 
inputs or final products, but also as inputs frequently provided 
in-house, which traditional value-added measures do not cap-
ture. Illustrating how relevant this omission can be, Miroudot 
(2016) matched occupation classifications and business functions 
for 37 countries over 1995–2013. This decomposition of jobs 
embodied in manufacturing according to business function by 
industry reveals considerable variation across industries, with 
employment in core activities (operations) at more than 90% in 
agriculture, but at only about 33% in coke and petroleum (figure 
6.7). This variability carries over to differences across countries 
as well. On average, the core activities of manufacturing firms 
account for only 50% of employment, meaning that half the 
employees of manufacturing firms perform services activities. 
This suggests that the services value added embodied in man-
ufacturing, and thus the contribution of services to GVCs, could 
be much higher than that captured by traditional value-added 
measures.
The implications of services in global value chains
As seen, services constitute the vital connecting links of value 
chains as well as a range of inputs sourced either at arm’s length 
or in-house. These value chains are “global” not just when trans-
actions cross international boundaries, but also when consumers 
FIGURE 6.7 Decomposition of jobs embodied in gross manufacturing exports, by business function by industry, 2011
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or providers do so, especially by establishing a commercial pres-
ence abroad.
Growth theories have emphasized that trade in intermediate 
goods and services generally improves the allocation of capital 
and labor across sectors and countries (Jones 2011). The litera-
ture helps draw out the implications of services in GVCs for two 
key aspects of economic performance: the growth of productiv-
ity and the evolution of comparative advantage.
The literature uses a framework based on Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and first applied to services broadly in Arnold, Javorcik, 
and Mattoo (2011) in a study of the Czech Republic. The typi-
cal study examines whether increased access to specific foreign 
services enhances performance in downstream sectors whose 
production is relatively intensive in those services. The usual 
specification takes the following form:
Yi,t = α + β × services linkagej,t–1 + Xj,t–1 × π + δi + γt + εi,t
and
services linkagej,t = ∑kaj,k × accessk,t
where i is the firm, j is the sector, and X is a matrix of sector-level 
control variables; Yi,t is the outcome of interest (productivity, 
comparative advantage); and services linkage, the key explan-
atory variable, is the interaction between a measure of a spe-
cific sector’s dependence on services inputs and a measure of 
services access (which could be related, for example, to serv-
ices policy reforms or foreign direct investment inflows).12 The 
hypothesis is that sectors using specific services more intensively 
benefit more from the reform of those services. This general 
framework becomes clearer in the examples discussed below.
For productivity
India offers a powerful example of the benefits of greater partic-
ipation in manufacturing value chains by foreign services firms. 
Conventional explanations of the modest resurgence of Indian 
manufacturing since the early 1990s have focused on policy 
reforms in manufacturing industries. But a key factor lies outside 
manufacturing and in the services sector. Reforms in the 1990s 
visibly transformed services sectors, with greater openness and 
improved regulation leading to dramatic growth in domestic and 
foreign investment. Indian manufacturing firms were no longer at 
the mercy of inefficient public monopolies but could now source 
services from a wide range of domestic and foreign providers 
operating in an increasingly competitive environment. As a 
result, they had access to better, newer, more reliable, and more 
diverse business services.
These improvements enhanced firms’ ability to invest in new 
business opportunities and better production technology, to 
exploit economies of scale by concentrating production in fewer 
locations, to efficiently manage inventories, and to coordinate 
decisions with suppliers and customers.
To analyze the link between services reforms and manufac-
turing productivity in India, Arnold and others (2016) collected 
detailed information on the pace of reform across Indian serv-
ices sectors, with a focus on entry and operational restrictions. 
To make this information amenable to econometric analysis, the 
authors aggregated it into time-varying reform indexes. They 
then related the total factor productivity of about 4,000 manu-
facturing firms to the state of liberalization in services sectors, 
taking into account other aspects of openness, such as tariffs on 
output and intermediate inputs as well as foreign direct invest-
ment in final and intermediate goods sectors.
The results suggest that pro- competitive reforms in banking, 
transport, insurance, and telecommunications boosted the pro-
ductivity of both foreign and locally owned manufacturing firms. 
A one-standard-deviation increase in the aggregated index of 
services liberalization resulted in a productivity increase of 11.7% 
for domestic firms and 13.2% for foreign enterprises. The largest 
additional effect was for transport reforms, followed by telecom-
munications and banking reforms.
Several other studies show that access to low-cost and 
high-quality (domestic or foreign) producer services can promote 
productivity and economic growth (Hoekman and Mattoo 2008). 
Using firm-level data for the Czech Republic for 1998–2003, 
Arnold, Javorcik, and Mattoo (2011) found a positive effect on 
the productivity of domestic firms in downstream manufacturing 
as a result of services sector reforms leading to greater foreign 
direct investment. Using the annual manufacturing survey of Chil-
ean firms, Fernandes and Paunov (2012) found a positive effect of 
substantial foreign direct investment inflows in producer services 
sectors on the total factor productivity of Chilean manufactur-
ing firms. Their findings also suggest that services foreign direct 
investment fosters innovation in manufacturing and offers oppor-
tunities for laggard firms to catch up with industry leaders.13 
These benefits arise not just from foreign investment but also 
from cross-border trade in services. For example, Amiti and Wei 
(2009a) found that services offshoring by high-income countries 
tends to raise the productivity of their manufacturing sector.14
To investigate whether regulations in domestic services 
markets have an effect on industries that rely on GVC linkages 
in services to generate value added, Van der Marel and Sáez 
(2016) differed from the earlier studies by looking at all down-
stream sectors rather than just manufacturing. They examined 
the impact on domestic value added rather than on productivity 
and on the link to upstream services sectors through backward 
foreign and domestic linkages. Their key interactive variables 
were a product of the foreign and domestic backward linkages 
of services for each downstream sector with services-specific 
regulatory policies. Both entry restrictions and policies affecting 
the operations of firms matter, but the strength of their impact 
depends on the type of backward linkages that are more impor-
tant for the industry in question. Industries that rely more on 
backward foreign linkages of services are adversely affected by 
entry barrier regulations, while those that rely more on backward 
domestic linkages of services are more sensitive to behind-the-
border regulations.
For comparative advantage
Since a large part of goods trade includes trade in embodied 
services, the development of the domestic services sector and 
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access to imported services inputs can be expected to influence 
comparative advantage in manufacturing trade. The impact of 
services development on manufacturing trade is not straight-
forward. Since services are used as inputs in the production of 
manufactured goods, their development can increase manufac-
turing production. But since services and manufacturing com-
pete for resources, the development of services can be at the 
expense of manufacturing. For example, the development of the 
services sector has drawn resources away from manufacturing 
not just in industrial countries such as the United Kingdom and 
the United States, but also in developing countries such as India 
(see, for example, Kochar and others 2006).
Some early studies examined the link between services 
as inputs in manufacturing and the pattern of manufacturing 
exports using single national input-output tables. For example, 
Francois and Woerz (2008) found significant and strong positive 
effects of increased business services openness (greater imports) 
on some industries. Their reliance on national data means that 
inputs cannot be broken down according to their origins, and 
services inputs are mismeasured due to two-way trade in inter-
mediate products. More recently, Stehrer, Foster, and de Vries 
(2012), Timmer and others (2013), and Liu and others (2017) used 
the newly constructed international input-output tables to more 
precisely measure the embodied services and indirect trade 
through other sectors.
Liu and others (2017) focused on two key services sectors: 
financial services and business services. Well-functioning finan-
cial sectors are critical in mobilizing resources, stimulating invest-
ment, and helping firms (and households) manage risk. Business 
services cover a variety of critical activities, from software con-
sulting and data processing to management consultancy, engi-
neering, and research and development. Intensive use of these 
modern services can help manufacturing firms increase pro-
ductivity, reduce the cost of doing business, expand their input 
choices, differentiate their products from those of competitors, 
and strengthen their after-sale customer services. But these are 
the services that most strongly provoke deindustrialization con-
cerns, such as financial services in industrial countries such as the 
United Kingdom and the United States and business services in 
developing countries such as India and the Philippines.
Liu and others (2017) quantified the indirect role of services 
in international trade in goods and construct new measures of 
revealed comparative advantage based on domestic value added 
in gross exports. Embodied services in manufacturing sectors 
were computed using a method developed by Koopman, Wang, 
and Wei (2014) and Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2013) that generalizes 
the vertical specialization measures proposed by Hummels, Ishii, 
and Yi (2001). Revealed comparative advantage is calculated 
based on domestic value added in gross exports, as in Koop-
man, Wang, and Wei (2014) and Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2013), who 
improved on the traditional (Balassa 1965) measure of revealed 
comparative advantage by taking into account both domestic 
production sharing and international production sharing.15
In Liu and others’ econometric analysis of the impact of 
services development on revealed comparative advantage in 
manufacturing sectors, the key explanatory variable is the inter-
action between a measure of the development of financial (or 
business) services and the financial (or business) services inten-
sity of each manufacturing sector. Domestic services develop-
ment has a mixed effect on the revealed comparative advantage 
of manufacturing exports: services development reduces the 
revealed comparative advantage of manufacturing exports in 
manufacturing sectors with low embodied services but increases 
it in sectors with a high degree of embodied services (figure 6.8).
Liu and others also considered the role of services imports 
in overcoming the limitations of domestic services markets. In 
countries with less developed services, manufacturing exports 
benefit more from access to foreign services inputs. Such a 
bypass effect is also discussed in a theoretical model by Ju and 
Wei (2010), which derives the conditions for financial globaliza-
tion to serve as a substitute for reforms of domestic financial 
systems. These results suggest that lower services trade barriers 
can help developing countries bypass inefficient domestic serv-
ices provision and promote their manufacturing exports through 
intersectoral linkages.
Direct and indirect value-added exports of services
The patterns of direct and indirect domestic value-added 
exports of services for financial and business services reveal how 
goods and services value chains and comparative advantage 
evolve (figures 6.9 and 6.10). The horizontal axis measures direct 
value-added exports of services and the vertical axis measures 
indirect domestic value-added exports of services (the value-
added exports of services embodied in exports of goods). Lines 
representing the median shares divide the countries into groups 
occupying four quadrants.
For financial services, figure 6.9 shows:
• In the bottom left quadrant are Greece, the Russian Feder-
ation, and Turkey. The low competitiveness of financial serv-
ices in these countries is reflected in the low share of direct 
exports and the low level of embodied exports — which could 
reflect the low financial services intensity of goods produc-
tion, the reliance primarily on imported financial services, or 
both.
• In the top left quadrant are China, India, and the Republic of 
Korea, which are not yet sufficiently competitive to export 
financial services directly but which do export a significant 
share indirectly. That goods sectors in these countries rely 
significantly on domestically produced financial services 
could be because financial services in these countries have 
reached an intermediate level of development at which they 
can compete in the domestic market but not yet internation-
ally. It could also be that restrictions on cross-border imports 
in these countries oblige goods producers to use domesti-
cally produced services.
• In the top right quadrant are Austria, Belgium, and the Neth-
erlands, whose more developed financial services sector 
exports both directly and indirectly.
• In the bottom right quadrant are such “mature deindustrializ-
ers” as the United Kingdom and the United States, where the 
Services trade and global value chains • 151
domestic tangible industries have shrunk in importance and 
financial services are mostly exported directly.
For business services, figure 6.10 shows two interesting 
differences:
• Given the greater cross-border tradability or openness to trade 
of business services, there is less scope for an intermediate 
stage (for countries to populate the top left quadrant). When a 
country is not competitive in producing these services, it nei-
ther exports them, nor do its goods sectors import them. When 
a country is competitive, it exports both directly and indirectly.
• In the bottom right quadrant, India offers an example of “pre-
mature deindustrialization,” where direct exports of busi-
ness services are high but indirect exports are low, perhaps 
because of the relative weakness of goods sectors.
FIGURE 6.8 Financial development and revealed comparative advantage, by degree of embodied services, 2005
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Source: Liu and others 2017.
Note: The figures show a negative association between the manufacturing revealed comparative advantage and a measure of financial development for a sector 
with low embodied financial services, but a positive association for a sector with high embodied financial services. Includes data for all Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development members except Chile, Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland as well as data for Brazil, Bulgaria, China, 
Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russian Federation, Chinese Taipei, and rest of the world.
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FIGURE 6.9 Direct and indirect value added exports of financial services as shares of GDP, 1995–2009
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–World Trade Organization Trade in Value-Added database.
Note: Includes data for all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members except Chile, Iceland, Israel, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Norway, and Switzerland as well as data for Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Russian Federation.
FIGURE 6.10 Direct and indirect value-added exports of business services as shares of GDP, 1995–2009
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–World Trade Organization Trade in Value-Added database.
Note: Includes data for all Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members except Chile, Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzer-
land as well as data for Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cyprus, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Russian Federation.
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Policy implications
Two types of policy issues inhibit an enhanced role for services in 
goods value chains and the emergence of services value chains: 
explicit restrictions on foreign services and services suppliers, 
and regulatory divergence across jurisdictions. Explicit restric-
tions on linking services, such as telecommunications, inhibit the 
emergence of all GVCs. Restrictions in other services — such as 
finance, business, education, and health services — either block 
the emergence of GVCs involving services or increase the associ-
ated transaction costs. Regulatory divergence reduces the inter-
compatibility of goods and services and services components 
that is needed to enable fragmenting production across jurisdic-
tions. This divergence is one reason that GVCs have been slow 
to emerge in sectors such as education and health. Regulatory 
cooperation is necessary not just to address regulatory diver-
gence, but also to facilitate the removal of explicit restrictions.
National policy barriers to international trade in services
Unlike the rich information on policies affecting trade in goods, 
information remains limited on policies affecting trade in serv-
ices.16 The World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Database 
reveals interesting policy patterns. Although public monopolies 
are now rare, and few services markets are completely closed, 
numerous second-generation restrictions remain on entry, own-
ership, and operations. Even where there is little explicit discrim-
ination against foreign providers, market access is often unpre-
dictable because the allocation of new licenses remains opaque 
and highly discretionary in many countries. Regulatory discretion 
is accentuated by a lack of accountability in a number of coun-
tries where regulators are not required to provide reasons for 
rejecting a license application or where foreign providers do not 
have the right to appeal regulatory decisions.
Across regions some of the fastest growing countries in Asia 
and the oil-rich Gulf states have restrictive policies on services, 
while some of the poorest countries are remarkably open — as 
measured by the Services Trade Restrictions Index, which takes 
values from 0 for completely open regimes to 100 for completely 
closed (map 6.1).17 Across sectors, professional services and 
transportation are among the most protected industries in both 
industrial and developing countries, while retail, telecommunica-
tions, and even finance tend to be more open (figure 6.11).18
International cooperation and services in global value chains
Much of the openness in services markets and the emergence 
of services-related GVCs has come from unilateral liberalization. 
Services trade negotiations have generated an abundance of 
rules and commitments that have enhanced the transparency 
MAP 6.1 Restrictiveness of services trade policy, 2008–10
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Source: Borchert, Gootiiz, and Mattoo 2014.
Note: This map compares the restrictiveness of services trade policy across countries based on the World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Index, which ranges 
from 0 (completely open) to 100 (completely closed), The World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Database covers 103 countries (79 developing) and financial, 
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and security of market access but have not produced much 
additional liberalization. One reason is a form of “negotiating 
tunnel vision,” which has led to a focus on reciprocal market 
opening rather than on creating the regulatory preconditions 
for liberalization. More could be achieved if negotiations offered 
regulators the opportunity not just to tie their hands (through 
agreed-on commitments) but also to secure assistance to deal 
with problems they cannot solve on their own.19
One obvious reason for international cooperation is that 
poorer developing countries do not always have regulatory insti-
tutions equipped to deal with international competition. These 
countries would participate meaningfully in negotiations that 
offered an opportunity not merely to make binding commitments 
but also to mobilize assistance for national regulatory reform. 
Market-opening negotiations now take their course in the WTO 
or in regional fora with only ad hoc links to international assis-
tance for regulatory reform, including that from institutions such 
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It would 
help establish a credible mechanism for regulatory assistance 
to support liberalization commitments by developing countries. 
Then, developing country policymakers would be reassured that 
any regulatory inadequacies that could undermine the benefits 
of liberalization would be diagnosed and remedied before any 
market-opening commitments take effect.
A second obvious reason for cooperation is that regulatory 
divergence segments markets. Firms must fulfill the regulations 
of each market separately — such as financial and accounting 
standards — which reduces the scope for exploiting economies of 
scale and the intensity of competition in each segment. Regula-
tory convergence through harmonization or mutual recognition 
of regulations — or a combination of the two, as has tended to 
happen in the European Union — creates an integrated market for 
competition, economies of scale, and GVCs to flourish.
A less obvious case for regulatory cooperation is that even 
countries with sound national regulatory institutions can find it 
difficult to address market failures related to services trade that 
originate outside their jurisdiction. A country will be reluctant to 
open its financial markets unless it is confident that it can pre-
vent market instability and protect its consumers from unsound 
foreign financial institutions, to let its citizens’ data flow to other 
FIGURE 6.11 Services trade restrictiveness by services sector and region
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Note: This figure compares the restrictiveness of services trade policy across countries based on the World Bank Services Trade Restrictions Index, which ranges 
from 0 (completely open) to 100 (completely closed). Data were collected between 2008 and 2010.
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jurisdictions unless it is reasonably certain that that data will be 
kept secure, or to open its transport and Internet-based services 
markets unless it is convinced that the gains from liberalization 
will not be appropriated by international oligopolies. In some 
cases, such as the supply of services through locally incorporated 
subsidiaries, the importing country can, at least in principle, deal 
unilaterally with market failure because the provider is in its juris-
diction. But doing so requires adequate regulatory capacity and 
could increase the costs of trade by fragmenting markets (say, by 
requiring local capital adequacy or local servers). In other cases, 
such as cross-border banking, transport, or data-processing 
services, addressing market failure efficiently requires the coop-
eration of the regulator in the exporting country.
A solution to these problems is the assumption of obligations 
not just by importing countries, but also by exporting countries 
when negative externalities are transmitted through exports of 
services. Regional and multilateral negotiations are now struc-
tured in a way that requires importing countries alone to make 
binding commitments to market opening, regardless of the con-
ditions in, or cooperative efforts by, source countries. Instead, 
market access commitments by importing countries could be 
made transparently and predictably conditional on the fulfillment 
of specific conditions by exporting countries. These exporter 
commitments need not be in the context of trade agreements 
but could be secured in other existing or new fora for inter-
national regulatory cooperation. Then, regulators in import-
ing countries would be reassured that exporting countries will 
cooperate to protect their consumers’ privacy, financial security, 
and well-being from the consequences of international market 
failures.
An example of exporting country regulatory commitments: 
data flows
International data flows provide an example of how such export-
ing country commitments work. By allowing communication and 
coordination of production across countries, such commitments 
have probably been the most important reason for the emer-
gence of GVCs. Governments are taking different approaches 
to regulating personal data collected by private enterprises. The 
European Union has the world’s most comprehensive legal data 
protection regime, the Data Privacy Directive adopted in 1995, 
which it plans to develop further.20
The Data Privacy Directive makes it illegal to transfer personal 
data outside the European Union unless the European Commis-
sion has found that the country receiving the personal data pro-
vides adequate protection. In the absence of an adequacy deci-
sion, data can be transferred to a third country under so-called 
derogations, the main ones being consent of the data subject, 
when the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract 
between the data subject and the controller or is necessary on 
important public interest grounds. The directive also allows for 
a cross-border transfer pursuant to a contract between the con-
troller and the processor that guarantees the same protection of 
the personal data as under the directive. A global conglomer-
ate can transfer data among its units where it has implemented 
binding corporate rules that also ensure data protection consis-
tent with the directive.
The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework, recently supplanted 
by the so called Privacy Shield Agreement, was developed in 
response to the absence of a finding that the United States pro-
vides adequate data protection.21 The European Commission 
recognized the Safe Harbor Framework Privacy Principles as pro-
viding adequate protection for personal data transfers from the 
European Union to approximately 3,000 companies in the United 
States that have signed up to the principles.22 A key difference 
between the Safe Harbor Framework and the EU Data Privacy 
Directive adequacy standards is that the Safe Harbor Framework 
recognizes the self-regulatory approach with U.S. government 
enforcement as an effective means of guaranteeing that personal 
data from the European Union will be accorded privacy protec-
tion consistent with the data privacy principles agreed under 
the Safe Harbor Framework. Under the Safe Harbor Framework, 
U.S. organizations can either join a self-regulatory privacy pro-
gram that adheres to the safe harbor principles or self-certify 
(most common) to the U.S. Department of Commerce that they 
are complying with the principles. The U.S. Department of Com-
merce reviews every self- certification and annual recertification 
submission it receives from companies. The U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission enforces the Safe Harbor Framework against com-
panies that self-certify as being in compliance.23
The exporting country commitments embodied in the Safe 
Harbor Framework have played a crucial role in allowing data flows 
between the European Union and the United States even though 
some concerns were expressed about its operation and effective-
ness. Some of these have been addressed in the recent Privacy 
Shield Agreement, but some shortcomings remain (Hufbauer and 
Jung 2016). A major remaining problem that can affect the emer-
gence of GVCs is that the agreement applies only to EU–U.S. data 
transfers and so is not useful for companies that want to transfer 
data globally — that is, to establish a globally accessible database 
or a global human resources information system. In sum, the Safe 
Harbor Framework is an example of remarkably effective, yet 
imperfect, dynamic regulatory cooperation.
Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated the role of services in GVCs, draw-
ing on selected evidence. For many purposes, services can be 
treated analogously to goods in both the measurement and the 
analysis of GVCs. And that is what existing trade in value added 
databases and the literature that relies on them have tended to 
do. Even though the share of services in trade in value added 
varies across countries and industries, it is generally high (and 
rising) and considerably larger than the share of services in gross 
trade. While directly exported value added has increased in 
recent years, close to two-thirds of the growth of services value 
added in exports is due to an increase in services embodied in 
exports of other sectors — particularly foreign services, revealing 
the growing importance of GVCs.
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The reasons for these developments are variants of the older 
arguments for why the share of services in GDP tends to grow: 
the splintering or outsourcing of services activities from manu-
facturing firms; the growing importance in a GVC world of con-
necting services such as telecommunications and transport; the 
growing services component in sophisticated manufacturing 
goods, such as software in cars; and the increase in the prices 
of services tasks relative to manufacturing tasks because man-
ufacturing tasks are easier to offshore to lower cost locations. 
However, there is little empirical evidence for these arguments, 
and understanding the reason for these developments should be 
an area for future research.
For services GVCs there are good reasons to look beyond the 
traditional arm’s length cross-border trade data, which ignore the 
large share of international transactions in services that take place 
through commercial presence for foreign direct investment. Ini-
tiatives to remedy the commercial presence gap are being taken 
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the OECD.
Some evidence shows that the emergence of GVCs through 
foreign direct investment in services can affect downstream sec-
tors. Improved access to finance, communications, transport, and 
other services, either through general reform or through reform 
of foreign direct investment, enhances manufacturing firms’ pro-
ductivity and other aspects of the performance of downstream 
firms. The development of domestic services sectors and access 
to foreign services can also shift the pattern of comparative 
advantage. Preliminary evidence suggests that trade in value 
added data could help in understanding dynamic structural 
change and deindustrialization — areas that merit more analysis.
Some have called for developing a notion of GVCs that goes 
beyond arm’s length market-based transactions to functions 
within the firm. It may be feasible to distinguish between tasks 
that would have been services if they had taken place at arm’s 
length (such as bookkeeping) and other tasks that are intrinsically 
agricultural or manufacturing in nature (such as wood process-
ing). But such distinctions slide on a slippery slope: ultimately, 
almost any task can potentially be conceived of as an arm’s length 
service. A horticultural laborer can be hired as a worker in a hor-
ticultural firm, or the laborer’s “fruit-picking” services can be pur-
chased from an individual or a firm. This kind of deconstruction of 
a firm into its constituent tasks could reduce each firm to a bundle 
of services regardless of what it ultimately produces.
Perhaps what really matters is not what a person makes but 
what the person does. For a long time, notions of economic 
performance have been closely tied to economic sectors — 
manufacturing, agriculture, and services. In a world of frag-
mented production these distinctions are hard to sustain and 
may not be economically meaningful. Instead, the focus could 
be on the implications of performing certain tasks. Do product 
design and marketing offer greater scope for innovation and 
learning-by-doing and thus for productivity growth than product 
assembly? Such task-based analysis — perhaps initially focusing 
on occupational structures — could be more help than the tradi-
tional sector-based analysis in comprehending the implications 
for individuals and countries of the new international division of 
labor.
Finally, some policies both inhibit and encourage the emer-
gence of services-related GVCs. Even though most services 
markets are much more open today, thanks to unilateral liber-
alization, services reforms remain incomplete, and barriers to 
domestic and foreign competition persist. Most of the policy 
barriers to competition and to foreign direct investment are 
not in goods but in services. For example, countries in South-
east Asia that have reaped huge benefits from the liberalization 
of trade and investment in goods continue to maintain restric-
tions on foreign presence in services. Trade in transport services, 
in particular, remains impeded in both industrial and develop-
ing countries by the exclusion of third-country providers and by 
quantitative restrictions in bilateral agreements.
International cooperation in services has attempted to rep-
licate the goods model of reciprocal market opening, but so 
far that approach has delivered little incremental liberalization. 
Much more could be achieved through a greater emphasis on 
regulatory cooperation. First, and most obviously, greater regu-
latory convergence — as in prudential regulation-intensive finan-
cial, health, education, and professional services — is needed 
to create more- integrated markets in which competition, econ-
omies of scale, and GVCs can develop. Second, credible regu-
latory commitments by exporting countries to safeguard the 
interests of consumers in importing countries — as for deposit 
protection when capital flows internationally or privacy when 
data flow internationally — could also induce greater liberaliza-
tion of explicit barriers to international transactions by providing 
importing countries with the regulatory reassurance they need.
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Notes
1. https://globalvaluechains.org/concept-tools.
2. A definition that does not include single international transactions 
also creates a slight awkwardness in the treatment of transactions 
located at the beginning or at the end of linear value chains. Even 
if they do not qualify as part of GVCs, the hypothesis must be that 
the history and the future matter. That is, a final import that involves 
border crossings at early stages of the value chain and an initial export 
that will cross other borders at later stages of the value chain should 
have different implications from those that do not.
3. For example, mode 3 trade exports represented on average 67% of 
total U.S. exports of services between 2009 and 2014 according to 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4. Mode 2 trade is captured in the balance of payments statistics cat-
egory “travel” but with limited disaggregation into sectors. Sales of 
services by foreign natural persons too are also largely covered in 
balance of payments statistics but are not identified separately from 
cross-border trade. Data on mode 3 trade in services are not part of 
balance of payments statistics but are collected separately by some 
countries, such as the United States and the European Union. Efforts 
to improve the measurement of mode 3 trade are discussed later in 
the chapter.
5. Restrictive policies of this sort are inherently difficult to identify and 
measure. Two initiatives provide evidence on these restrictions: one in 
the OECD and another in a collaborative project between the World 
Bank and the WTO. Some evidence regarding these measures is pre-
sented later in the chapter.
6. This is not an exhaustive list of how services participate in GVCs. Other 
relevant aspects, such as bundling goods and services and services as 
value- creating activities, are discussed in detail in Miroudot (2016).
7. See OECD (2013) for details on the algebraic definitions of these 
components.
8. More generally, firm ownership, whether domestic or foreign, has 
been found to be a relevant dimension of firm heterogeneity, with for-
eign-owned firms often associated with greater exports, higher pro-
ductivity, more- intensive use of imported intermediates, and different 
patterns of value added (Fetzer and Strassner 2015). This in itself 
makes firm ownership a relevant dimension to understand participa-
tion in GVCs and the effects it may have in an economy.
9. Examples include the 2010 National Organizations Survey in the 
United States (Brown, Sturgeon, and Lane 2014) and two Eurostat sur-
veys on the international sourcing of business functions by enterprises 
(Nielsen 2008).
10. Statistics on business functions based on labor force surveys should 
be interpreted carefully since comparability across countries may be 
affected by statistical conventions in the construction of input-output 
tables. For example, data collected at the enterprise level and the 
establishment level could yield different information for identical pro-
cesses on what is provided in-house and what is outsourced.
11. For example, Lodefalk (2013) showed that services embedded in 
Swedish manufactured goods account for a major and increasing 
share of Sweden’s services exports. Similar evidence is presented for 
other European countries in Boddin and Henze (2014), Crozet and 
Milet (2014), Kelle (2013), and Kelle and Kleinert (2010). Baldwin, Ito, 
and Sato (2014) showed that since the 1990s the share of value added 
in manufactured products in Asia has shifted decisively away from 
manufacturing and toward services.
12. The services linkage variable can be interpreted as a weighted aver-
age across sectors of the access measure of interest, with the weights 
indicating the sensitivity of sector j to input k (weight αj,k can, for 
example, be the share of k in total inputs of j).
13. Similar results have been found for Sub- Saharan Africa (Arnold, 
Mattoo, and Narciso 2008) and Indonesia (Duggan, Rahardja, and 
Varela 2013).
14. While services offshoring has both positive and negative effects on 
domestic employment, Amiti and Wei (2009b) showed, at least for 
the United States, that it tends to enhance domestic employment on 
average.
15. Revealed comparative advantage based on gross exports (used as a 
dependent variable) can cause an endogeneity problem because the 
embodied services (used as explanatory variables) are part of gross 
manufacturing exports. Liu and others (2017) avoided this problem 
because manufacturing revealed comparative advantage is based on 
the value added created by the factors employed in manufacturing 
sectors, excluding the embodied services in gross exports contrib-
uted by the factors employed in services sectors.
16. Two major initiatives to address this gap in information are in the 
OECD and in a collaborative project between the World Bank and the 
WTO. This section describes information on trade policies for serv-
ices contained in the earlier World Bank Services Trade Restrictions 
Database. This database covers 103 countries, five major services 
sectors — financial services, basic telecommunications, transport, dis-
tribution, and selected professional services — and the relevant modes 
of services delivery. This information, collected in 2008–10, has been 
subsequently updated only for some countries. Even though there is 
evidence of few major policy changes in the last few years, the data 
presented here are best seen as indicating broad patterns rather than 
the precise current situation in specific countries.
17. The analysis assesses policy regimes in their entirety and assigns them 
to one of the following five principal categories: completely open (that 
is, no restrictions at all), completely closed (that is, no entry allowed at 
all), virtually open but with minor restrictions, virtually closed but with 
limited opportunities to enter and operate, and a residual “intermedi-
ate” category of regimes that allow entry and operations but impose 
restrictions that are neither trivial nor stringent. It is convenient to 
assign a value to each of these five categories of regimes on a scale of 
decreasing openness from 0 to 1 with intervals of 0.25.
18. There is some evidence of recent reform in services sectors. For 
example, a lifting of foreign equity caps, partly or fully, is observed 
in Indonesia (air transport, architecture, engineering, telecommunica-
tions, distribution services, audiovisual services, and logistics), China 
(distribution services and maritime transport), and India (air transport, 
insurance, and broadcasting). Mexico has opened the telecommuni-
cations sector and introduced procompetitive reforms.
19. The capture of regulatory barriers by established services providers 
may also partly explain the limited progress on this front.
20. As a directive, implementation of the Data Privacy Directive is left to 
EU member states, which vary widely in their enforcement. The Euro-
pean Commission is seeking to update it as a regulation.
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21. According to a 1999 opinion from the Article 29 Working Party, the 
U.S. approach was seen as not providing adequate protection in all 
cases for personal data transferred from the European Union.
22. The Safe Harbor Framework consists of seven principles that reflect 
the key elements of the EU Data Protection Directive. The main ones 
are commitments to give European data subjects notice that a U.S. 
entity is processing their data; to limit onward transfers of data to 
countries that also subscribe to the Safe Harbor principles or are sub-
ject of an adequacy finding; to take reasonable steps to protect per-
sonal data from loss or misuse; to process personal data only for the 
expressed purposes the organization intends to use it; to give Euro-
pean data subjects access to their personal information and the ability 
to correct, amend, or delete inaccurate information; and to commit 
to enforce the principles and give European data subjects access to 
affordable enforcement mechanisms.
23. To date, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has brought 10 Safe 
Harbor–related enforcement actions. The agency acts on referrals 
from EU data protection authorities and from third-party private dis-
pute resolution providers, as well as on its own.
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